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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the objectives of the association and not a "'detached and disinter-
ested generosity' which is the requisite of a gift under § 102. ' '42
The last case dealing with strike benefit payments is that of
Mabel Phillips.3 The facts in Phillips are almost identical to those
in Hagar, and the tax court relied heavily on Hagar in holding the
benefits taxable. In Phillips, the taxpayer was a journeyman stereo-
typer and a member of a local of the Stereotypers' and Electro-
typers' International Union that struck the newspaper where he was
employed. To receive his benefit payments, taxpayer had to be a
member of the union in good standing and had to "sign-in" daily
at the strike headquarters. The amount of his payments, which
were substantial in comparison with his salary, was not dependent
upon his marital status, number of dependents or financial need,
but was dependent solely upon his classification as a journeyman.
The court concluded that these factors, plus a finding that the union
was morally obligated under its constitution to make the payments
once the taxpayer went on strike, prevented them from being con-
sidered as a gift.
While other areas of the gift vs. income dispute may remain
"unclear and uncertain," it would seem that the decisions in Godwin,
Hagar, Halsor, and Phillips have removed some of the confusion
as to the income tax consequences of union strike benefit payments.
Although the question whether a strike benefit payment in a given
case is a gift or taxable income still remains a factual one, it seems
certain that the benefits received in any case in which the facts are
not very nearly on all fours with Kaiser cannot be classified as a gift.
THOMAS E. CAPPS
Torts-North Carolina's "Good Samaritan" Statute
The 1965 North Carolina General Assembly passed a "Good
Samaritan" statute which provides that:
Any person who renders first aid or emergency assistance at the
scene of a motor vehicle accident on any street or highway to
any person injured as a result of such accident, shall not be
"Id. at 740.
"P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 65, 268 (1965).
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liable in civil damages for any acts or omissions relating to such
services rendered, unless such acts or omissions amount to wanton
conduct or intentional wrongdoing.'
Apparently the purpose of the act is to encourage aid to persons
injured in automobile accidents. The underlying rationale seems to
be that the legislation will encourage aid at the scene of accidents
by removing the possibility of liability for negligence.2
Although similar statutes have been passed by many other states,3
there remain questions as to the constitutionality, the necessity, and
the effectiveness of such statutes.
The statutes have been attacked as unconstitutional on the ground
that they abolish common-law remedies in violation of state consti-
tutional guarantees of civil remedies.4 The North Carolina Consti-
tution provides that "every person for an injury done him in his
lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law. . .. "'
Statutes which have eliminated liability for injuries caused by
negligent conduct, but have left unaltered liability for injuries caused
by higher degrees of misconduct, have been held constitutional as
mere restrictions of remedies, not a complete removal of them.'
Other states have upheld the abolition of the common-law remedy
for breach of promise to marry.7 However, in Illinois under a
constitutional provision similar to North Carolina's,8 the abrogation
of the remedy for alienation of affections was held unconstitutional.
9
In Texas, also under a constitutional provision similar to North
Carolina's," statutory abolition of municipal liability for injuries
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-166(d) (Supp. 1965).For the view that emergency aid is often withheld for fear of liability
see Kearney, Why Doctors Are Bad Sanaritans, READER'S DIGEST, May,
1963, p. 87; Survey, NEw MEDICAL MATERIA, April, 1961, p. 30.
a For a comparison of various "Good Samaritan" statutes see 13 DE
PAUL L. REV. 297 (1964).
'See 43 B.U.L. REv. 140 (1963) ; 41 NEB. L. REv. 609 (1962).
N.C. CONST. art. I, § 35.
a Emberson v. Buffington, 228 Ark. 120, 306 S.W.2d 326 (1957). The
dissenting opinion expresses the opposing view that a person injured as the
result of a negligence of another has a remedy only for that negligence, and
a statute that withdraws liability for negligence completely withdraws the
remedy. Id. at 130, 306 S.W.2d at 332.
'Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 5 N.E.2d 815 (1936).
'ILL. CONST. art. II, § 19.
' Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946)."oTEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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sustained on the streets and sidewalks was declared unconstitution-
al."1
In Osborn v. Leach the North Carolina court stated by way of
dictum that statutory impairment of the right to recover for an
injury would be unconstitutional. 2 The court has, however, held
the Workman's Compensation Act,' 3 which in some instances sub-
stitutes statutory remedies for common-law remedies, to be a reason-
able exercise of the police power.14 Quaere, whether the court will
view the Good Samaritan statute as a constitutional restriction of
the remedy, rely on Osborn and hold it unconstitutional, or uphold it
as a reasonable exercise of the police power.
If the statute proves constitutional, its necessity may still be
questioned. The act adds no additional inducement to persons al-
ready under a duty to aid the injured. In North Carolina these
include persons legally responsible for the original injury 5 and the
driver, regardless of fault, of any automobile involved in the acci-
dent.1
Even where there is no such antecedent duty, the act seems
unnecessary since it does not appear that under common-law rules
liability has been unjustly imposed in the Good Samaritan situa-
tion.' 7 The general rule is that one who voluntarily undertakes to
"Lebohm v. City of Galveston, 154 Tex. 192, 275 S.W.2d 951 (1955).
On rehearing the court stated two instances in which the abolition of
remedies had been sustained:
Thus it may be seen that legislative action withdrawing common-law
remedies for well established common-law causes of action for injuries
to one's "lands, goods, person, or reputation" is sustained only when it
is reasonable in substituting other remedies, or when it is a reason-
able exercise of the police power in the interest of the general welfare.
Id. at 199, 275 S.W.2d at 955.
12 135 N.C. 628, 631, 47 S.E. 811, 812 (1904).
'2 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-101 to -122 (1965).
"Lee v. American Enka Corp., 212 N.C. 455, 193 S.E. 809 (1937);
Heavner v. Town of Lincolnton, 202 N.C. 400, 162 (S.E. 909 (1932).
1 Parish v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 221 N.C. 292, 20 S.E.2d 299
(1942). See generally PROssER, ToRTs 338 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), ToRTs § 322 (1965).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-166(c) (1953), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-166(c) (Supp. 1965).
" When liability has been imposed on a volunteer, there has usually been
some substantial departure from the accepted standard of conduct. The
most common departure seems to be a long delay in obtaining medical
assistance for the injured person after he has been taken into the exclusive
care and control of the volunteer. See, e.g., Gates v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.,
185 Ky. 24, 213 S.W. 564 (1919); But see Steckman v. Silver Moon, Inc.,
77 S.D. 206, 90 N.W.2d 170 (1958).
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aid another is held to the exercise of reasonable care under the
circumstances to protect the safety of the person he aids.' How-
ever, the care that is reasonable in the emergency situation is only
that degree of care that would be exercised by a reasonable man
in a like emergency.'9
Generally Good Samaritan statutes have been deemed necessary
to encourage aid of physicians and other professionally trained per-
sons who fear malpractice claims.20 In fact, many states have limited
the immunity to this class of persons.2' Among the reasons given
for the fear of liability are reported estimates that from six to nine
thousand claims for medical negligence or malpractice are filed each
year,22 and that one out of seven physicans has been subjected to
such a claim.3
The view has been taken that the "plight" of physicians has
been exaggerated. 24 From a survey of physicians in Connecticut,
it was concluded that the effect of a malpractice suit upon the prac-
tice of a physician is much less than is generally believed.2 5 Another
report indicated that such suits do not have a "serious or extended
effect" on the physician's practice.2 6 More specifically, an American
Medical Association search found no appellate cases involving
physicians at roadside emergencies." Furthermore, an investigation
of professional liability insurance claims indicated that few mal-
18 PROSSER, TORTS 339 (3d ed. 1964).
19 Kataoka v. May Dep't Stores Co., 28 F. Supp. 3 (S.D. Cal. 1939);
Owl Drug Co. v. Crandall, 52 Ariz. 322, 80 P.2d 952 (1938) ; Shloss Poster
Advertising Co. v. Hallman, 255 N.C. 686, 122 S.E.2d 513 (1961).
" See Kearney, supra note 2; STETLER & MORITZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT
AND THE LAW 334 (4th ed. 1962); Survey, NEw MEDICAL MATERIA, supra
note 2.
21 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2144; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1152
(Supp. 1963); Wis. STAT. ANNO. § 147.17(7) (1963).
2 Silverman, Medicine's Legal Nightmare, SATURDAY EVENING POST,
April 11, 1959, p. 13.
" Committee on Medicolegal Problems, Professional Liability and the
Physician, 183 A.M.A.J. 695 (1963).
2" Averbach, Good Samaritan Laws, CASE AND COMMENT, March-April,
1964, p. 13; Steincipher, Survey of Medical Professional Liability in Wash-
"ington, 39 WASH. L. REv. 704, 707 (1964).
25 See Wyckoff, The Effects of a Malpractice Suit Upon Physicians in
Connecticut, 176 A.M.A.J. 1096 (1961).
2" How State Medical Society Executives Size Up Professional Liability,
164 A.M.AJ. 580, 582 (1957).
"' Steincipher, supra note 24, at 706 n.21 (citing DOCTOR & LAW, Nov.
3, 1963, p. 3).
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practice claims have been based on the typical Good Samaritan
situation.28
Even if a negligence action is brought against a physician, the
plaintiff may have difficulty establishing that the physician failed
to fulfill his legal duty under the circumstances surrounding the
roadside treatment.2 Since cases involving knowledge peculiar to
the science of medicine require expert testimony, 0 the plaintiff must
generally produce as expert witnesses other physicians, who are often
reluctant to testify against fellow physicians. 1 Assuming such
testimony is available, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
physician failed to have the skill and learning possessed by other
physicians similarly situated,32 or that he failed to exercise the re-
quired care, which is only reasonable care and diligence under the
circumstances.33
It has been suggested that it is not the fear of the ultimate
liability, but the "involvement" resulting from the commencement
of the action of malpractice or the mere allegation of negligence,
that is harmful to the reputation of the physician.34 If, as it has
been indicated, allegations of negligence do not often arise as a
result of roadside treatment,3" it seems that the fear of liability in
such situations has resulted from a carry-over from the increasing
fear of malpractice claims generally. Perhaps some approach to
this problem other than the Good Samaritan statute would have been
more appropriate.
The fact that the North Carolina version has eliminated some
of the problems of interpretation arising under other "Good Samari-
tan" statutes3" does not seem sufficient to insure its effectiveness.
" Id. at 706 n.21 (citing A.M.A. NEws, Oct. 26, 1964, p. 14, col. 2).
" Devices have been employed in some jurisdictions to facilitate the
plaintiff's recovery in malpractice actions. For a discussion of the applica-
tion of some of these devices see 64 COLJum. L. Rnv. 1301, 1304 (1964).
Despite such attempts it is suggested that physicians occupy a protected
and favored position at law. Steincipher, supra note 24, at 732.
" Hawkins v. McCain, 239 N.C. 160, 79 S.E.2d 493 (1954).
" See Curran, Professional Negligence-Some General Comments, 12
VAND. L. REv. 535, 539 (1959).
" Hawkins v. McCain, 239 N.C. 160, 79 S.E.2d 493 (1954).
Id. at 168, 79 S.E.2d at 499.
"See Curran, supra note 31, at 542.
' See Steincipher, supra note 27, at 706.
"Problems of interpretation arise from the use of such uncertain terms
as "gross negligence," "emergency situation," "emergency care," and "good
faith." For criticism of such language in other statutes see 64 COLUm. L.
Ruv. 1301, 1308 (1964); 13 DE PAUL L. REv. 297, 300 (1964); 75 HAgv.
L. REV. 641 (1962).
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In order to encourage the aid of volunteers, the statute must first
be widely publicized, and it must give adequate assurance that the
threat of liability for negligence has been eliminated.
The statute will probably be publicized through professional
journals as well as through ordinary news media. Nevertheless,
persons who have allegedly failed to offer aid for fear of involve-
ment may not be completely assured that the threat has been re-
moved. Though the statute bars an action for negligence, the injured
person might still allege wanton conduct.3 7 There seems to be no
assurance that physicians will be protected against common-law
liability for abandonment by the statute.3 Furthermore, the fact
that the statutes vary from state to state as to persons and conduct
protected39 seems sufficient to defeat their effectiveness as to inter-
state travelers. °
In light of this discussion it is concluded that the enactment of
the statute will be of little value. In the first place it may be un-
constitutional. Secondly it seems to be directed at an evil that may
not exist at all. Finally the statute may not be effective in encourag-
ing aid from those to whom it is properly directed.'
" Wanton conduct is conduct which is in "conscious and intentional dis-
regard of and indifference to the rights and safety of others." Hinson v.
Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 28, 92 S.E. 2d 393, 397 (1956). However, in an
action for injuries resulting from operation of an automobile the evidence
showed a failure to keep a proper lookout and a failure to maintain control
of the automobile. It was held that there was a question for the jury whether
such conduct constituted wanton conduct. Harper v. Harper, 225 N.C. 260,
34 S.E.2d 185 (1945) (construing South Carolina "guest statute").
"Once a physician has undertaken to render services, he must continue
such services, unless there is a limitation by contract, until the treatment
is no longer necessary, or until the relationship is dissolved by the parties,
or until reasonable notice has been given so that the patient may have an
opportunity to engage the services of another. Groce v. Myers, 224 N.C.
165, 29 S.E.2d 553 (1944). The statute protects acts or omissions relating
to such services rendered. It is possible, at least, that the act of leaving an
injured person after having undertaken to aid him will not be found sufficient-
ly related to the services to be protected, or that it will be found to be wanton
conduct that is not protected by the statute.
so For a comparative treatment of the various statutes see 13 Dn PAUl. L.
REV. 297, 301 (1964).
" It seems highly unlikely that such persons would be aware of the
particular provisions of each statute, if they knew a statute existed.
"1 On its face the statute applies to any person who renders aid under
the designated circumstances. By literal interpretation it seems that one
who has been responsible for an original injury would be relieved of liability
for negligence in rendering aid to the injured person. Perhaps the court
will avoid this undesirable result by interpreting the statute as relieving the
tort-feasor of liability for negligence in his capacity as rescuer but not
relieving him of his liability for aggravation as original tort-feasor. Normal-
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It seems that a possible result of the statute is that emergency
aid will not be encouraged in fact, yet a person injured as a result
of conduct that is a substantial departure from the accepted conduct
in like situations, but less than wanton conduct, would be denied
relief on the questionable belief that such denial has been necessary
to achieve a broader public service.
JERRY M. TRAmmE:LL
ly such tort-feasor is liable for the natural and probable consequences of
his tort, including aggravation. Bell v. Hankins, 249 N.C. 199, 105 S.E.2d
642 (1958).
